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A former FBI employee who raised questions about the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol had his security clearance reinstated and was awarded 27 months of backpay after being suspended since February 2022, his lawyer told CNN.
FBI staff operations specialist Marcus Allen had his security clearance suspended in 2022 when the FBI cited security concerns related to his “allegiance to the United States” in a letter previously shared with Congress.
Allen testified at a congressional hearing led by House Judiciary Chair Jim Jordan last year after the bureau informed Congress it had revoked the security clearances of three agents who either attended the riot at the US Capitol or espoused alternate theories about the Capitol attack.
When explaining its initial decision to revoke Allen’s security clearance to Congress, the FBI wrote that its investigation showed Allen had “questionable judgment, unreliability, and unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations,” indicating that he could not properly safeguard classified or sensitive information.
The FBI listed a variety of reasons for suspending Allen in their letter, including a September 29, 2021, email in which Allen called on FBI officials to exercise “extreme caution and discretion in pursuit of any investigative inquiries or leads pertaining to the events of” January 6, according to a copy of the letter.
Allen testified during last year’s congressional hearing that he “played no part in the events of Jan. 6,” but alleged that he was retaliated against “because I forwarded information to my superiors and others that questioned the official narrative of the events of Jan. 6.”
The bureau reinstated Allen’s security clearance on May 31 after reaching a settlement agreement, Allen’s lawyer, Tristan Leavitt, told CNN. Allen then resigned from the bureau on Monday.
“This is total vindication for Marcus,” Leavitt, president of Empower Oversight, said in a statement. “The FBI has completely backed down and provided everything that we had asked for on behalf of Marcus. It’s clear from the evidence and the FBI’s capitulation there was absolutely no truth to their accusations.”
In response to his security clearance being reinstated, Allen stated, “it’s been a difficult couple of years, and I am truly grateful for my friends and family who helped us through this.”
In a statement provided to CNN, the FBI defended how the process was handled.
“While we can’t comment on the specifics of any settlement, both parties agreed to resolve this matter without either admitting wrongdoing. Any allegation that the Director lied to Congress is false. The FBI takes seriously its responsibility to FBI employees who make protected disclosures under whistleblower regulations, and we are committed to ensuring they are protected from retaliation,” the FBI said.
Jordan, who has used cases like Allen’s to raise allegations of discrimination and bias within the FBI, pressed Attorney General Merrick Garland during a congressional hearing on Tuesday whether Allen had been wrongfully retaliated against.
“I don’t know anything about the facts of that case. Retaliating against whistleblowers is against the law and it will be punished,” Garland testified.
For more CNN news and newsletters create an account at CNN.com
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What qualifies as a subject cybersecurity incident? Will we estimate our seemingly losses and the outcomes of commercial disruption? What had been our recovery costs? What longer-term remediation costs perform now we must consist of in our 8-K incident portray? How did our actions following the breach replicate the response readiness functionality previously detailed in our most up-to-date Blueprint 10-K disclosure?
The SEC’s cyber disclosure rules: classes realized so a ways in year one
These and other questions illustrate why complying with the U.S. Securities and Change Commission’s (SEC/Commission) amended Cybersecurity Disclosure Rule—which became once formally adopted 365 days ago and efficient for this previous year’s annual stories and for cyber incidents going down after December 18, 2023—requires deep and nuanced recordsdata of cybersecurity, incident response, recordsdata governance, monetary reporting, investor relations, regulatory compliance and risk management. This mixture of expertise makes it crucial for CFOs and chief recordsdata security officers (CISOs) to collaborate carefully, in phase through two-ability education. CFOs can savor to quiet school CISOs on materiality evaluations and reporting to the board, while CISOs can relieve finance chiefs better perceive recovery costs, remediation efforts, single versus mixture breaches, and the nature of compromised recordsdata.
Partnering carefully with their CISO is surely one of a variety of actions CFOs can savor to quiet take into accout to toughen their cybersecurity disclosures, preparedness and incident evaluate process.
Adopted closing July and efficient in mid-December, the SEC’s up so a ways cybersecurity disclosure rule requires Blueprint 10-K filings to characterize 1) processes for identifying, assessing and managing subject matter cybersecurity dangers and threats, and a pair of) the board of directors’ oversight role in assessing and managing cybersecurity dangers. The rule of thumb moreover requires SEC registrants to subject an 8-K cybersecurity incident portray when a breach (either a single assault or a chain of incidents) is deemed to savor a subject affect to the commercial. An incident portray can savor to quiet be filed inner four commercial days of the corporate’s materiality resolution.
The nature of these requirements commands the CFO’s state involvement and oversight, besides to the CISO’s expertise and engagement. Every executives needs to make certain about the threshold at which a cyberattack rises to the stage of a subject incident—and making this resolution might well require extra frequent dialogue and collaboration. This form they wish to agree on the materiality resolution process. What perform the rules require, how perform we practice them, what recordsdata perform we need, who needs to be alive to, who decides, and the procedure perform we guarantee the resolution is reached inner an inexpensive time length are questions finest answered in the chilly of the day slightly than in the heat of the moment.
It moreover formulation that these two executives must perceive their deepest accountability for contributing to moral disclosures. That is also one thing unusual for the CISO and an procedure in which the CFO can present steering. In the aftermath of the SEC’s SolarWinds allegations, CISOs and other executives must presume that the Commission is preserving them as responsible for the accuracy of public filings because it does CFOs and CEOs.
So, what precisely is the SEC making an are attempting to search out in these filings? We’ve taken a end watch at fresh cybersecurity disclosures. Our prognosis of these disclosures, and the SEC responses thereto, implies that:
In reporting cybersecurity incidents, we’re noting an obvious willingness of some registrants to sigh incidents even when materiality has no longer yet been fully established—apparently erring on the side of warning slightly than risk no longer disclosing when, later in hindsight, they’ll savor to quiet savor. With admire to these voluntary disclosures, the SEC workers lately inspired registrants to sigh such incidents underneath a definite item of Blueprint 8-K, akin to Item 8.01 (Diversified Occasions), to defend a ways from diluting the price of Item 1.05 disclosures (Arena matter Cybersecurity Incidents) and potentially rising investor confusion. Unnecessary to utter, a 2nd Blueprint 8-K would be required if the registrant subsequently distinct that the incident is subject matter, in which case the disclosure would drop underneath Item 1.05. In such instances, the registrant might well take a look at with the sooner Blueprint 10-K filed underneath Item 8.01.
Some companies present intensive recordsdata about the nature of attacks and their containment recommendations. Others decide for a excessive-stage ability, reporting recordsdata that will maybe well practice to almost any cybersecurity incident. Some companies usually described taking instructed actions—akin to keeping apart affected programs and conducting forensic investigations—once an incident became once detected. Most companies reported that that they had notified relevant legislation enforcement companies and had been working carefully with them as required. Many disclosures referenced particular conversation protocols for inner reporting and external conversation with stakeholders.
The SEC took one filer to activity for vague language regarding materiality in an 8-K incident portray that ran afoul of its disclosure requirements. We’ve moreover viewed filers distinguish between monetary materiality and operational materiality of their 8-Ks, whatever the truth that the rule specializes in a single theory of materiality of which the SEC’s definition remains consistent. Reviews many times cited activation of commercial continuity plans to lower carrier disruptions; however, crucial points regarding the effectiveness of these plans or the time frames for paunchy recovery had been frequently disregarded.
Most SEC registrants agree that identifying a functional chief for cybersecurity matters and providing periodic cybersecurity-connected reporting to the board are most simple practices. Of camouflage, even although most companies cite their readiness to respond to cyber incidents, about one-quarter of the ten-K filings we reviewed perform no longer explicitly characterize preparedness recommendations. Whereas virtually all companies referenced efforts to mitigate cybersecurity dangers through established processes, procedures and programs, a smaller yet significant majority disclosed alignment with external frameworks—which implies there’s room for enchancment in adopting known finest practices. Interestingly, a well-known half of organizations reported the exhaust of external just cybersecurity advisers, indicating that such third-birthday celebration expertise is functional or most simple.
CFOs can fabricate better cybersecurity disclosures and relieve guarantee their filings fulfill SEC requirements by taking the following actions:
These two executives needs to be joined on the hip to navigate the cyber disclosure rules minefield efficiently. When ending an 8-K incident portray, many CFOs will need CISOs to relieve them perceive the nature of the assault, the variety of recordsdata (for my allotment identifiable recordsdata, precious mental property, and masses others.) that became once compromised, and the scope and effort of the recovery effort. CISOs will moreover need finance leaders to educate them about incident identification, response protocols and other aspects of cyber risk mitigation that SEC registrants must element of their 10-K filings. To boot to teaching CISOs on materiality determinations and the procedure cybersecurity incidents affect investor relations, CFOs can savor to quiet take into accout arranging for CISOs to participate in conferences of the board committee that oversees cybersecurity disclosures (usually a disclosure, audit or expertise committee).
Thus a ways, many organizations savor relied on unusual approaches and solutions for determining materiality—many times with refined, cyber-connected adjustments—to evaluate whether or no longer a cyber incident deserves disclosure. Whereas this means has handed muster so a ways, extra immense adjustments seemingly are wished. An efficient cyber incident materiality framework can savor to quiet tackle a combination of monetary, operational and technical concerns. It might well in reality probably perchance quiet moreover comprise moral estimates of recovery and remediation costs (both immediate and prolonged-term) besides to context: A $20 million ransomware tournament has diversified impacts on a $100 million company versus a $10 billion enterprise. Whether an assault is a single incident or a chain of connected, or aggregated, breaches over time moreover warrants consideration.
The SEC did no longer present a template for the unusual cybersecurity disclosure requirements, and we’ve viewed some cyber disclosure approaches already drop out of favor (e.g., differentiating between monetary materiality and operational materiality). As companies proceed to conform, their 10-K and 8-K disclosures will naturally evolve to better replicate the intent of the rule. As such, finance and recordsdata security leaders can savor to quiet observe how other companies craft their disclosures. To boot to learning annual stories, CFOs and CISOs can video show 8-K stories on incident trackers. Final analysis, here’s a learning process, and it behooves the CFO and CISO to realise what’s working and what’s no longer.
As the regulatory spotlight on cybersecurity capabilities intensifies, CFOs can savor to quiet take into accout ways they’ll lead and make contributions to efforts to present a enhance to cybersecurity risk management and governance practices and incident identification, response and reporting processes. This effort moreover can savor to quiet focal point on extra particular determinations of incident materiality, among other aspects of the SEC’s cybersecurity disclosure rule.
Some boards are adding directors with cybersecurity expertise (fancy the “monetary reporting expert” on the audit committee), however the post-SEC cyber disclosure-rule trend has yet to be distinct. A Heidrick & Struggles portray effectively-known that finest 14% of most up-to-date board appointments in 2022 had cybersecurity expertise, a decline from 17% the outdated year. With out a recordsdata offered for 2023, the appointments throughout 2024 shall be of hobby when printed subsequent year.
As with previous requirements from the Commission for ticket spanking unusual disclosures, we demand the SEC workers to was less tolerant of vague language, generic boilerplate discussions and other disclosure practices that inch counter to the letter and spirit of its rules. This makes it crucial for the CFO to fabricate a solid partnership with the CISO and put certain pointers and processes for defining, identifying, responding to and reporting subject matter cyber incidents in 8-K and 10-K filings.
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From the delivery of U.S. investigations into the terrorist assaults of 11th of September, 2001, the question of whether the Saudi executive would possibly presumably well per chance had been eager has hovered over the case.
The FBI, after the most huge criminal probe in its history, concluded that a low-stage Saudi legit who helped the first two hijackers in California met them by likelihood and aided them unwittingly. The CIA said it saw no proof of a increased-stage Saudi role. The bipartisan 9/11 commission adopted these findings. A tiny FBI team continued to dig into the question, turning up knowledge that raised doubts a pair of few of these conclusions.
But now, 23 years after the assaults, unique proof has emerged to counsel extra strongly than ever that no lower than two Saudi officers deliberately assisted the first Qaida hijackers after they arrived within the US in January 2000.
Whether or not the Saudis knew the males had been terrorists remains unclear. However the unique knowledge reveals that each officers worked with Saudi and other non secular figures who had ties to al-Qaida and other extremist groups.
Quite a lot of the proof has been gathered in a prolonged-operating federal lawsuit in opposition to the Saudi executive by survivors of the assaults and kinfolk of of us that died. That lawsuit has reached a serious second, with a settle in Recent York preparing to rule on a Saudi motion to brush off the case.
Already, though, knowledge suggest within the plaintiffs’ case — which entails movies, mobile phone data and other paperwork that had been quiet soon after the assaults however had been never shared with key investigators — argues for a basic reassessment of the Saudi executive’s that you’ll be in a position to be ready to evaluate involvement with the hijackers.
The courtroom data also elevate questions about whether the FBI and CIA, which persistently brushed apart the significance of Saudi links to the hijackers, mishandled or deliberately downplayed proof of the kingdom’s that you’ll be in a position to be ready to evaluate complicity within the assaults that killed 2,977 of us and injured thousands extra.
“Why is this data coming out now?” requested retired FBI agent Daniel Gonzalez, who pursued the Saudi connections for nearly 15 years. “We ought to indulge in had all of this three or four weeks after 9/11.”
Saudi officers indulge in prolonged denied any involvement within the area, emphasizing that they had been at warfare with al-Qaida smartly prior to 2001.
They’ve also leaned on earlier U.S. assessments, especially the one-web page abstract of a joint FBI-CIA document that modified into publicly released by the Bush administration in 2005. That abstract said there modified into no proof that “the Saudi Executive or participants of the Saudi royal household knowingly equipped toughen” for the assaults.
Pages of the document that had been declassified in 2022 are extra serious of the Saudi role, describing huge Saudi funding for Islamic charities linked to al-Qaida and the reluctance of senior Saudi officers to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
The plaintiffs’ myth quiet leaves critical gaps within the account of how two identified al-Qaida operatives, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, refrained from CIA surveillance foreign, flew into Los Angeles below their very indulge in names after which — no topic speaking no English and ostensibly interesting no one — settled in Southern California to begin preparing for the assaults.
Silent, the lawsuit has uncovered layers of contradictions and deceit within the Saudi executive’s portrayal of Omar al-Bayoumi, a heart-aged Saudi graduate pupil in San Diego who modified into the central resolve within the hijackers’ toughen community.
Almost right away after the 9/11 assaults, FBI brokers identified Bayoumi as having helped the 2 young Saudis rent an condominium, location up a bank myth and indulge in other wants. Bayoumi, then 42, modified into arrested on Sept. 21, 2001, in Birmingham, England, where he had moved to continue graduate experiences in exchange. Scotland Yard terrorism investigators wondered him for a week in London as two FBI brokers monitored the classes.
Bayoumi dissembled from the delivery, newly released transcripts of the interrogations expose. He said he barely remembered the 2 Qaida operatives, having met them by likelihood in a halal cafe within the Los Angeles suburb of Culver City, after he stopped on the Saudi Consulate to renew his passport. The proof reveals he in actuality renewed his passport the day prior to the encounter within the cafe, thought to be one of many indications that his meeting with the hijackers modified into planned.
After stress from Saudi diplomats, Bayoumi modified into freed by the British authorities with out being charged. U.S. officers did not try to indulge in him extradited.
Two years later, in Saudi Arabia, Bayoumi sat for interviews with the FBI and the 9/11 commission that had been overseen by Saudi intelligence officers. All every other time, he insisted that he modified into proper being hospitable to the hijackers. He knew nothing of their plans, he said, and modified into in opposition to violent jihad.
Gonzalez and other FBI brokers had been dubious. Even supposing Bayoumi modified into supposedly a pupil, he did nearly no discovering out. He modified into a ways extra active in developing a Saudi-funded mosque in San Diego and spreading money throughout the Muslim neighborhood. (The Saudi executive paid him surreptitiously thru an aviation-services and products company in Houston.)
FBI officers in Washington permitted the Saudi depiction of Bayoumi as an amiable, a piece bumbling executive accountant searching to enhance his expertise, and as a non secular however moderate Muslim — and never a seek for. The lead agent on the FBI team that investigated him, Jacqueline Maguire, told the 9/11 commission that by “all indications,” Bayoumi’s reference to the hijackers had been the outcomes of “a random encounter” on the cafe.
The 9/11 commission permitted that overview. The commission’s investigators smartly-known Bayoumi’s “obliging and gregarious” manner in interviews and called him “an not going candidate for clandestine involvement with Islamist extremists.” The panel stumbled on “no credible proof that he believed in violent extremism or knowingly aided extremist groups.”
But in 2017, the FBI concluded that Bayoumi modified into, in truth, a Saudi seek for — though it kept that discovering secret until 2022, after President Joe Biden ordered companies to declassify extra paperwork from the 9/11 data.
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Exactly whom within the Saudi executive Bayoumi modified into working for remains unclear. FBI reports dispute him as a “cooptee,” or piece-time agent, of the Saudi intelligence service, however hiss he reported to the kingdom’s noteworthy aged ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. (Lawyers for the Saudi executive indulge in continued to repeat Bayoumi’s earlier denials that he ever had “any assignment” for Saudi intelligence.)
One other layer of Bayoumi’s hidden identity has emerged from paperwork, videotapes and other affords that had been seized from his home and placement of enterprise on the time of his arrest in England. The plaintiffs had sought that knowledge from the Justice Division for years however received nearly nothing until the British authorities started sharing their copies of the topic topic in 2023.
Even though Saudi officers recount that Bayoumi merely volunteered at a local mosque, the British proof points to his deeper collaboration with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The Saudi royals had established the ministry in 1993 as piece of a governing pact with the noteworthy clergy. In return for political toughen, they gave the clerics effective aid watch over over domestic non secular matters and funded their efforts to unfold their fundamentalist Wahhabi impress of Islam foreign.
From the delivery of the FBI’s 9/11 investigation, brokers pored over a short excerpt of a videotape recorded at a event that Bayoumi hosted for some two dozen Muslim males in February 2000, soon after Hazmi and Mihdhar arrived in San Diego.
It modified into one other twist of fate, Bayoumi claimed, that he held the match within the hijackers’ condominium. The 2 young Saudis had nothing in truth to realize with the gathering, he said, however he wished to retain his partner and other females in his indulge in condominium, sequestered from male guests in line with conservative Muslim custom.
The FBI did not part a elephantine copy of the VHS recording with either its indulge in area brokers or the 9/11 families, who sought it persistently. (An FBI spokesperson declined to touch upon the bureau’s handling of the Bayoumi proof.) However the elephantine recording modified into equipped to the plaintiffs by the British police last December.
The longer version casts Bayoumi’s gathering in a completely different gentle. Even though the nominal guest of honor is a visiting Saudi cleric, the 2 hijackers are in moderation presented to the other guests and are apparently on the heart of the proceedings.
After figuring out a total lot of the event guests for the first time, the plaintiffs’ attorneys had been ready to myth that many went on to play critical roles within the hijackers’ toughen community, helping them location up web and mobile phone service, join English classes and aquire a previous car.
“Bayoumi hand-picked these people due to he knew and assessed that they had been smartly-suited to manufacture the Al Qaeda operatives with crucial sorts of toughen,” the attorneys wrote of the event guests.
One other videotape taken from Bayoumi’s Birmingham house is even extra at odds with the image he conveyed to the FBI and the 9/11 commission. The video follows Bayoumi as he excursions Washington, D.C., with two visiting Saudi clerics early within the summer of 1999.
Lawyers for the Saudi executive called the recording an innocent keepsake — “a vacationer video that entails footage of artwork, flowerbeds, and a squirrel on the White Condo lawn.” However the plaintiffs’ attorneys posit a extra ominous motive, especially as Bayoumi specializes in his necessary area: an huge presentation of the Capitol constructing, which is shown from a sequence of vantage points and in relation to other Washington landmarks.
“We greet you, the esteemed brothers, and we welcome you from Washington,” Bayoumi says on the video. Later, standing prior to the camera, he reports as “Omar al-Bayoumi from Capitol Hill, the Capitol constructing.”
The footage reveals the Capitol from relatively about a angles, noting architectural points, entrances and the movement of safety guards. Bayoumi sprinkles his narration with non secular language and refers to a “belief.”
“Bayoumi’s video footage and his narration must not that of a vacationer,” the plaintiffs contend in a single courtroom myth, citing the evaluation of a aged FBI skilled. The video, they add, “bears the hallmarks of scare planning operations identified by regulations enforcement and counterterrorism investigators in operational movies seized from scare groups in conjunction with Al Qaeda.”
Lawyers for the Saudi executive brushed apart this conclusion as preposterous.
However the video’s timing is great. In step with the 9/11 commission document, Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders started discussing their “planes operation” within the spring of 1999. Even though they disagreed on which U.S. landmarks to strike, the document states, “all of them wished to hit the Capitol.”
The 2 Saudi clerics who joined Bayoumi on the outing, Adel al-Sadhan and Mutaeb al-Sudairy, had been so-called propagators — emissaries of the Islamic Affairs ministry despatched to proselytize in a international country. U.S. investigators later linked them to a handful of Islamist militants.
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Most notably, Sudairy, whom Bayoumi describes as the emir, or chief, of the Washington outing, spent loads of months residing in Columbia, Missouri, with Ziyad Khaleel, a Palestinian-American al-Qaida member who delivered a satellite tv for computer mobile phone to bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998. The Qaida chief previous the mobile phone to coordinate the lethal bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, FBI officers indulge in said.
Sudairy and Sadhan, who had diplomatic fetch 22 situation, had beforehand visited California, working with Bayoumi and staying at a tiny San Diego guesthouse where the hijackers later lived. Many unique crucial points of their travels had been revealed within the British paperwork. The 2 Saudis had beforehand denied even interesting Bayoumi, thought to be one of many faux claims in depositions coordinated by the Saudi executive.
The unique proof also reveals that Sadhan and Sudairy worked with the other key Saudi legit linked to the hijackers, the cleric Fahad al-Thumairy. In step with one FBI supply, it modified into Thumairy, the 32-365 days-extinct imam of a prominent Saudi mosque in Culver City, who received the hijackers after they arrived on Jan. 15, 2000, and arranged for his or her short-timeframe housing and other wants.
Thumairy, a Ministry of Islamic Affairs legit who modified into also assigned to the Saudi consulate, insisted he had no reminiscence of Hazmi and Mihdhar, though the three had been viewed together by loads of FBI informants. Thumairy also denied interesting Bayoumi, no topic mobile phone data that expose no lower than five dozen calls between them. Thumairy’s diplomatic visa modified into withdrawn by the Advise Division in 2003 thanks to his suspected involvement with terrorist job.
In an huge evaluation of mobile phone data produced by the FBI and the British authorities, the plaintiffs also documented what they called patterns of coordination fascinating Bayoumi, Thumairy and other Saudi officers. (Lawyers for the Saudi executive said the calls had been about mundane non secular matters.)
Two weeks prior to the hijackers’ arrival, as an illustration, the tips expose calls among Bayoumi, Thumairy and the Islamic Affairs director on the Saudi Embassy in Washington. Bayoumi and Thumairy also made relatively about a calls spherical that point to a smartly-known Yemeni American cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, who later emerged as a truly crucial Qaida chief in Yemen.
It has prolonged been identified that Awlaki, who modified into killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2011, had some contact with Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego and met two other 9/11 hijackers after transferring to a mosque in Falls Church, Virginia. But many FBI investigators believed he modified into radicalized smartly after 9/11 and wouldn’t indulge in identified the hijackers’ plans.
Recent proof filed within the courtroom case points to a extra critical relationship. Awlaki looks to indulge in met Hazmi and Mihdhar as soon as they arrived in San Diego. He joined Bayoumi in helping them rent an condominium and placement up bank accounts, and he modified into viewed by others to indulge in served as a relied on non secular consultant.
Awlaki’s worldview “matched relatively carefully to al-Qaida’s on the time,” said Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, a biographer of Awlaki who served as an skilled for the plaintiffs. “The unique knowledge now changing into public, on top of what we already learn about his teachings and associations, makes it cheap to total that Awlaki knew the hijackers had been piece of the al-Qaeda community.”
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